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Incomprehensible in South Vietnam

The war in Quang Nam Province created change at a pace that was at times incomprehensible. Just about the time a Marine infantry squad (13 Marines) was beginning to click as a unit, a booby trap (IED), firefight, or a sniper would take out the squad leader, the best fireteam (4 Marines) leader, the squad’s best point man or multiple members. If the squad leader was lost, the platoon commander had to rebuild the squad from within by often appointing an inexperienced fireteam leader to take over the squad. It would not be unusual to lose the squad leader and a fireteam leader in one engagement. These frequent occurrences often left a squad with only 7-9 members and the fireteams down to 3 members. And to confound the situation, platoons would sometimes have 2-3 squads under-manned as above. To make matters worse, platoons were still sent forward for a week of patrol base operations well forward of the rest of the company. The same three daylight combat patrols, two ambushes per night, one or more listening posts, and perimeter lines still had to be manned for local security. One would wonder how could they stay awake during the night whether on lines or in an ambush site or listening post. The truth is they didn’t and couldn’t. Squads had many self-configured watch systems. More than we wanted to know, one-man watch systems were used, and who knew whether he was awake or asleep. There was just never enough rest.

We never had experienced sergeants as squad leaders, they were generally corporals, and very young ones. Fireteams were led by lance corporals and sometime privates first class who had been in the bush the longest. The survive-ability of squad leaders and fireteam leaders was problematic and yet, when we lost one there were others experienced or not, ready and willing to assume the position. The maturity of these young Marines (18-21 years old) and the willingness to take on this enormous responsibility of leading daily patrols and night ambushes could leave me speechless. As the platoon sergeant and I took on the responsibility of preparing them for the accountability they were accepting, the spirit and determination was boundless, but the knowledge and experience was severely lacking. The teaching was immediate and continuous even as the patrols, ambushes, and casualties never lessened.

Sharing knowledge was continuous at the fireteam, squad, and platoon level. You simply could not teach them fast enough. Lives were in the balance. In units where this was not the case, tragic outcomes awaited the units.

james benson2 Comments