Accountability by Lorenz

General Stephen Lorenz (USAF, Retired) published an excellent essay on leadership in his book, titled “Lorenz on Leadership.” Initially, I didn’t think I would finish it, because it appeared to be simply a compilation of his speeches. However, I stayed with it long enough to get hooked and commend it to all who consider themselves leaders at almost any level. In retrospect, I think he made the same mistake I did with “Executive Courage…” in that the best chapters begin to appear towards the middle of the book.

The General explains how accountability often offers the leader respect and admiration, Nonetheless, respect and admiration are fragile (my word) and not all leaders are up to the challenge of accountability. In my day, I have known some leaders who literally rejected the idea that they were accountable for the results (both good and bad) of their organization, especially if they were not present for a tragic failure that occurred under their tutelage. The fact is, accountability especially for senior leaders, can be cruel and unforgiving even if the leader is away on vacation or asleep after hours. History is replete with Navy Captains who were relieved of their duties after the duty officer ran the ship aground in the wee hours while the Captain was asleep in his cabin. According to Lorenz, “it is cruel, this accountability of good and well-intentioned men”.

I experienced this cruel accountability first hand (at least in my own mind), but in this case was never even blamed for what occurred. Maybe because at that time in South Vietnam there were so many tragic events that one such as the following was never even mentioned. On or about January 1, 1970, while I was on R&R (rest and recuperation) with Mary in Hawaii and contrary to my platoon’s standard operating procedures, the platoon was attacked at the base of what was know as Charlie Ridge. Of course, I did not hear of this event until I returned to my platoon almost a week later.

Routinely each platoon in the Company would depart the Company forward combat base independently, move forward and west to conduct “search and destroy” operations from a remote platoon patrol base (nothing more than a perimeter of foxholes). As the platoon commander, i was religious about moving every third night to set up a new base of operations. The troops didn’t like the tactic, because the platoon move was at night after their daylight patrols and before their nightly ambushes and listening posts. They were already tired. Moreover, upon arrival at the new chosen site, they had to dig their foxholes once more. ( Later I will post a blog of General Lorenz’s maxims, one of which says “Comfort leads to complacency and comfort kills.” This is precisely what he was referring to.) I knew that to remain static in the same location for more than two days gave the Viet Cong sufficient time to position their mortars, plan their fires on our position, and assault right after cessation of the mortar fires when our confusion was pegged, and medivacs were being called for any mortar casualties.

Sure enough (this was the story told to me by the troops when I returned), the VC attacked the platoon sometime after midnight. The platoon fought valiantly, fought off the assault, and even pursued the VC for a kilometer or so. However, the end score was two Marine KIAs and one other severely wounded. As frequently occurred, no VC bodies were discovered (the VC were quite good at retrieving their wounded and even their dead at times). 2nd Platoon had paid a hefty price for violating one of our standard procedures by staying in one place too many nights (three in this case).

So why was I technically accountable when I wasn’t even there? Because as the platoon commander, I should have had the platoon sergeant better informed (although I know he knew the right thing was to move that third night) as to adherence to our standard procedures in my absence. I think he caved to the troops desire to stay in place a third night for rest and comfort reasons. He was thus, responsible for the losses, but I remained accountable. The platoon sergeant on that night was a great Marine in my judgment who made Sergeant Major before retiring. Unfortunately, he was later killed in a tragic boating accident on one of the Tennessee Valley Authority rivers/dams.

I knew the two KIAs and the wounded Marine well, and their loss still grieves me when I am reminded of that fateful night. I hope this event helps to prove the maxim that leaders are accountable for all results and consequences that occur on their watch.

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