During the fall of 1969, in order to thwart the black market and on no notice, U.S. units were ordered to collect all of the Military Payment Certificates (MPC), declare the bills void of value, and replace them with MPC of a different color. This was done to make all MPC that had made its way into the hands of the Viet Cong, South Vietnamese soldiers, and local merchants useless and by doing so discourage participation in the Black Market. This procedure could be damaging to non-U.S. military engaging in commerce of any kind with MPC. Of course, the day of devaluation was highly classified so that the unannounced procedure would be a deterrent to those doing business on the BlacK Market using MPC.

At the time, I was the infantry platoon commander (30-55 Marines including attachments) for the 2nd platoon of India Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. Our battalion had already planned a two-company operation to kick off the same day as the yet to be announced MPC conversion, which caused pause at battalion as to whether to cancel the operation. The conversion meant that one officer (essentially the executive officer) in each company had to stay behind and collect, count, and account for everyone’s MPC and issue an equivalent of new MPC. This caused a delay in the commencement of the operation as the battalion commander decided to execute the operation as planned by collecting the MPC from those companies participating in the operation first, so that they could depart for the “line of departure” of the offensive. The officers conducting the MPC exchange would execute the exchange with the “stay behind” support personnel and the third company throughout the day and early evening.

Since India company was short of officers, there was no executive officer who would reside at the battalion command post and oversee the administrative, so one of the platoon commanders from the company would have to stay behind and execute the order. As I was the senior lieutenant in India Company and over my objections, I was directed by the company commander to stay behind and carry out the MPC exchange. I would rejoin the company on day two of the operation.

So, all day and into the night, I completed the conversion and the associated administrivia (sic). Mentally spent, I crashed on a cot in the company rear area around 2100 (9:00 pm) seeking some rest and hoping to find transportation the next morning to rejoin my platoon.

Around 2200, a messenger found me and delivered a message from the battalion operations officer that I was to meet him and the battalion commander at the Combat Operations Center (COC) immediately. Upon arrival both were hovering over a map and seeing me, the operations officer called me to the map and showed me the current nighttime positions of India and Kilo company (the other company participating in the operation) located along the Son Cu Dee River. The companies had swept south during the day, guiding on the river and would reassume the sweep early this next morning. The day’s operation had been fruitless creating the theory that the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army units had simply fled south rather than fight, which was routine (it also occurred to me that the planned operation had been leaked, and they had fled beforehand). Hoping for a better second day, the battalion commander directed that we create a “blocking position” further south of the next day’s operation hoping that the two-company sweep would force any remaining VC/NVA into the fire of the blocking position. The problem was how to get a unit to the river to establish the blocking position by first light the next day. It was decided that no platoon from the third company charged with the defense of the battalion command post could be spared due to the need for security of the battalion command post sense two companies were already absent due to the operation.

Then came the surprise. The operations officer told me that trucks had been dispatched to pick up a platoon from Kilo company, and they should arrive in an hour or so and upon their arrival, I would assume command of the platoon. Meanwhile, I should prepare an order to march southwest to a designated position where we would establish a blocking position to engage and destroy any enemy moving south to avoid India and Kilo companies sweep south the next morning. Subsequently and when feasible, I would transfer back to my platoon in India company and continue the operation for the remainder of the week. He advised me that time was of the essence since we had a night 6 kilometer movement to contact in an area known to be heavily populated by VC that preferred to move at night. A chance encounter was a high probability.

I hustled back to my company’s area to write my order. I had been told that the Kilo platoon did not have an officer and that the young platoon sergeant might not possess the experience and training to execute the mission. I was curious at how he would accept me stepping in and taking control of his platoon, which was demonstrative of his company commander doubting his ability to carry out such a mission in terms of night navigation and the call for and control of supporting arms if needed.

When I got back to the company area I learned that Sergeant Angel, the India Company 81 millimeter forward observer, had also missed the kick off of the operation that morning due to a visit with the battalion surgeon. Sergeant Angel was an experienced Marine and like most forward observers, an excellent navigator as well as using the compass at night which is essentially “dead reconning”. I was glad to hear that he was available to go with me as it is important to have someone you can trust to help with navigation and confirm your location, which was to end up being a nightmare in itself. Moreover, it gave me the instant supporting arms expert if needed.

Upon their arrival into the battalion area, I sent a messenger to tell the Kilo platoon sergeant to meet with me (I may have asked for the squad leaders too, but my memory fails me in that regard). When he arrived, I explained the plan and delivered my 5 paragraph order for the night movement. I was surprised to learn that his platoon had no idea why they have been pulled from the lines, loaded upon trucks, and returned to the battalion area. When the platoon sergeant learned that I was to take command of his platoon (even if just for the night), and we were going on a night tactical movement through a known VC populated area, he was an unhappy Marine. He wanted to know if I knew that the platoon had been in a line formation, sweeping south in the boiling sun for most of the day and were in no condition to make a 6 kilometer movement to contact all night, link up with their company, and pick up the sweep south the next day. When were they supposed to rest? His points were well received, but these were our orders, and I gave him 45 minutes to prepare and give his order to the Marines, change their socks, and scarf down a c-ration meal.

Because of the lighting around the command post and the rush-rush to get the order written and delivered, I had not checked the moon phase (which is a common night movement procedure) to see how much ambient light we would have during the march (knowing the moon phase is informative, but there is nothing you can do to change it). As we formed up, Sergeant Angel and I walked #2 and #3 in the column with Sergeant Angel right behind the point man keeping him on azimuth and recording the pace count so we would know how far we had travelled. As we got out of range of the command post lighting, I realized that we had zero ambient light from the moon! We quickly became disoriented to the extent we were unsure of the location of the entrance/exit to the command post compound. The absence of any light whatsoever necessitated that the Marines stay in a tight column and in touching distance of each other. I could hear the grousing like, “what asshole had this hair brain idea?” Since we hadn’t even found our way out of the compound, I let them grouse. After about 20 minutes of a very slow march we came to the perimeter security concertina wire and no foxholes were visible where we could ask a Marine on the lines, “where is the compound entrance?”

There was no alternative but to counter-march and start over. Counter-marching, especially at night and when troops are already tired, is a sure-fire way to get Marines and soldiers agitated, profane, and untrusting of their leadership, and they didn’t even know who I was or who Sergeant Angle was. I don’t know how long it took for us to discover the compound entrance/exit, but it was nerve-racking, notwithstanding the grumbling and lack of knowledge of our whereabouts inside the compound.

Once we were out on our way at a snail’s pace and at the first security halt (stop, observe, listen), I walked back the length of the column (surprised how long the column was), assured the Marines we could do this, reminded them of the dangers ahead and the requirement for noise discipline, and to be alert.

We moved out once more taking short security halts to listen (we couldn’t see anything even after our eyes adjusted to the darkness), confirm the compass reading and pace count, and estimate the distance we had moved. Although the poor noise discipline was worrisome, we had not encountered any sign of VC (it was too dark to see any signs anyway), and realizing the danger we faced, the troops grumbling that had occurred before we got out of the compound was minimal.

At approximately 0300 (3:00 am), Sgt Angel and I sensed that we should be getting fairly close to the river where we were to establish the blocking position, so we halted and sent a four-man reconnaissance team forward to see if they could find the river. It seemed to take an inordinate amount of time for them to return (you tend to forget how long it takes to move 200-300 meters and back when it is totally dark and the team has to move tactically by bounds, and they reported that the river was not in sight and that they had not encountered any sign of VC. Sergeant Angel and I got under a poncho liner with a flashlight and reviewed the map compared to the pace count trying to estimate our position. We concluded that the lack of visibility had shortened our pace (it is a known fact that a patrol’s pace count is higher in low visibility, because patrol members take shorter steps), which meant it took more steps to cover the same amount of ground.

I passed the word to the platoon sergeant that “we would be moving out in 5 minutes and to be sure he had all of his Marines up and ready.” After about 25 minutes of moving by bounds, a messenger came forward to report, “Sir, we are missing 3 men!

That was the last thing we needed to hear as the tactical situation was problematic, visibility zero, and the troops were seemingly “walking asleep.” We halted and I went back to speak to the platoon sergeant and he said that “at every security halt when you passed the word back to move out, half of the Marines were down and asleep and had to be individually and carefully wakened to maintain some level of noise discipline. The men had no idea of where they were and their readiness to fight was zip". His level of frustration was pegged. Since it was out of the question to turn the entire column around and go back and search for the missing 3 men, I told the platoon sergeant to take four men and go back and find them, and we would stand fast until they returned.

Because of the darkness, the team had to head back using a compass back azimuth, but after 30 minutes or so the platoon sergeant radioed forward that he had found the 3 Marines asleep vicinity of our last security halt, and that they were on there way back. We began alerting the rest of the column (most were asleep), and upon the return of the search team and the missing 3, we were finally moving once more. After 30-40 minutes of movement by bounds and couple of security halts, we went to a knee once more and sent the recon team forward again to find the river. It was approaching 0500 (5:00 am) when they returned to report that the river was only about a kilometer to the west.

I passed the good news back to the platoon sergeant who must have been grateful but acted pretty stoic I was told (he was extremely agitated at his squad leaders for the repeated inaccurate reports of having all their men and causing him to give me bogus reports). We commenced our movement forward having given the platoon sergeant and his squad leaders extra time to ensure an accurate count of their men. By the time we reached the river, we had “before morning nautical twilight" (BMNT), which meant that after a five plus hour tension filled night, we now had some visibility and could begin see to dig-in and establish the blocking position and lay down a murderous fire should India and Kilo companies push the VC into our kill zone.

About that time, I saw the platoon sergeant coming toward me with a weary and seemingly embarrassed corporal in tow to tell me that once more, he was missing two men. All I could think of was, will this ever end?

I told the platoon sergeant to do what he had to do, but find the missing Marines and keep me informed, because I did not want to report to battalion that we were in place if we were missing two men. As it was almost daylight now, the search party would be very visible increasing the danger as they headed back to conduct the search. However, the daylight would also help them find the missing Marines. Not knowing for sure how long the two men had been missing (since the counts had never been correct), my fear was that the missing Marines could have been left further back than the last security halt and may have even been captured. However, not long thereafter, the platoon sergeant called to say they had found the Marines who had moved well of the trail (for a softer place to rest) then awakened to discover they had been left behind and had no idea where we were or which way to go to find us.

Not long after their return, India company called to say “they were about 20 minutes from our linkup point”. Not long after their arrival, Kilo company arrived, and the Kilo company commander came to our position to reclaim his platoon. I left it to his platoon sergeant to explain the events of the previous night. Before I left the platoon, I thanked the Kilo platoon sergeant as he had suffered a night from hell and after a quick c-ration breakfast, would have to kick off the day as we moved south once more.

After an almost 6 hour movement to contact with an exhausted platoon, zero ambient light, little noise discipline, displaced Marines causing recurrent non-accountability of 5 men, Sergeant Angel and I returned to India Company where I briefed the India company commander on the night’s foray. He was mostly and rightly unsympathetic and said, “grab a meal, we will kick off in less than an hour guiding south along the river. Our company will take the point; Kilo will be drag. Your platoon will be the point platoon since they didn’t walk point yesterday. We will change positions and Kilo will take the point on order. Welcome back.

After a quick cold spam and fruit cocktail breakfast with instant coffee, I was now back at home with my trustworthy platoon and ready to fight another day.

Anecdote. I do not mean to disparage the Kilo company platoon as I had not been present for the long hours of their sweep south the day before, only to be sent on another mission that included a night movement to contact with a leader they did not now.

Of course, the sweep, even with our blocking position netted zero bounty. Moreover, this was an example of occasional irrational expectations and group think occurring at higher headquarters that placed a platoon of Marines in harms way without any thought of their readiness for the mission and the environmental factors (moon phase) affecting mission execution.