Some years ago, while serving at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps in Washington, D.C., the late LtGen Carl Mundy, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, called me in to his office and gave me the following orders that had originated with General Al Gray, Commandant.  The order went something like this:

• JIm, you will head up a 3-man study group, and for the next six months conduct a staff study on the ability of the Marine Corps to participate and contribute to the country’s counter-narcotics effort (drug war).  You will study both the demand and supply side of the question.  Moreover,

• Examine what the Corps can contribute within the limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act and complete your written report within the allotted period.

• You will be ably assisted by LtCol Bob Flanagan from the aviation branch.   The Coast Guard has a significant interest in the study and will provide one of its lawyers to help with the legal minefields you will encounter.

• The Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Branch (my branch) will provide administrative support and fund your travel.  I expect you will initially meet with Customs and the Drug Enforcement Agency leadership and Border Patrol officials here in Washington.  They will advise you on your follow on travels, which will include the southwest border and more.  Most of your work will revolve around the supply side of the problem, but keep an open mind regarding the demand side and report your findings no matter how minor.

• This project will require each of you to think deeply regardless of our traditional roles and missions.  Gen Mundy’s comment led to the title of our final report, “Think Piece on the U.S. Marine Corps’ Contribution to the Nation’s Counter-Narcotics Effort.”

• During the next six month, we examined the flow of illegal drugs into Florida and California in shipboard containers; through ports of entry such as Tijuana to San Diego, but most of our work and subsequent successes involved working with the Border Patrol along the southwest border of the United States.

• Even though our mission had nothing to do with illegal immigration, the Border Patrol leadership and agents made sure we understood the seriousness of the problem and the legal issues associated with capturing illegals, holding them, and then in most cases releasing them back into Mexico only to recapture them again at a later date.  Moreover, when illegals were initially caught, no one knew if they were illegals seeking a better life, hard core criminals, or drug smugglers, which complicated any role the military might play. 

With that as a backdrop and to establish some degree of credibility, I am now going to focus my closing on the issue at hand, do walls, fences, and barriers work?

From what we learned in our time working with the Border Patrol in the  high threat areas of Tucson, Nogales, El Paso, and San Diego, a barrier that would inhibit, redirect, and/or slow the ingress of illegals would be a centerpiece of any southern border strategy.  It is impractical,  expensive, and unnecessary to build a barrier the length of the southern border.  But strategically placed barriers along the illegals easiest and most frequently used approaches will deter the intruders, sending them along approaches that are more difficult for them to traverse and easier for the Boarder Patrol to  protect.  In other words, the barriers canalize the intruders into crossings that they do not prefer and law enforcement can observe technologically and otherwise and quickly react to observations and other alerts.

Any infantryman will tell you that barriers are useful in the defense, because they canalize the opponent into areas that facilitate our success.  Whether, we call it a wall, fence, barrier, or obstacle, it can be breeched with appropriate tools, time, and apparatus, but nonetheless, it will be critical in any defensive strategy by canalizing, buying time for the border patrol to react, causing illegals to select crossing sites of our choosing, and facilitating the economy of our forces in the observation and protection of the border.

The president has done a good job of making the case for a wall, fence, or barrier.  Over time, he rightfully concluded that a wall , not unlike the great wall of China, is not the answer.  He has listened to the advice and counsel of the Border Patrol leadership and modified his plans and demands accordingly.

In summary, a strategically placed barrier should be a centerpiece of our southern border strategy.  It should not be delayed  as the threat is growing as evidenced by the organization of additional caravans of illegals.  To withhold the border wall funding under the pretense of tying the wall to a comprehensive border strategy is nothing but a political ploy and another example of counter-productive delay and compromise, which at best will provide a untimely, sub-optimal final product, if there is one agreed upon at all.  If this dance continues, the Congress will have once again kicked the ball down the field and proven once more that they are much better at creating gridlock than responding to the needs of the country.